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Survival Strategies and Characteristics of Start-Ups:  
An Empirical Study from the New Zealand IT Industry 
 
S. Almeida 
Department of Work and Organizational Studies, The University of Sydney 
M. Fernando 
School of Management and Marketing, The University of Wollongong 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to report the findings of an exploratory study on the 
characteristics of New Zealand start up IT firms that survived the dot.com collapse. 
The paper is based on the in-depth interviews of nine entrepreneurs of start-up IT 
firms in New Zealand. The findings reveal how moderate strategy types influence 
survival, and what core organizational characteristics influenced the realisation of 
these strategies. These findings indicate that the firms that survived projected 
characteristics of holistic strategic balance, mastering resources and unifying focus. 
Successful firms made purposeful choices on resource allocations and realized 
moderately simple strategies. In contrast, firms that failed projected a general lack 
of strategic balance, mastering and trade off. These firms’ organizational themes 
realized excessively complex strategies with no distinct focus.  
 
1. Introduction 
Why did so many ‘promising’ start-up IT firms fall short of expectations? Did their 
downfall have anything to do with over diversification? The purpose of this paper 
is to report the findings of an exploratory study of the distinct characteristics of 
New Zealand start up IT firms that survived the dot.com collapse. To understand 
the characteristics of the surviving IT start-up firms, it is important to understand 
the firms’ strategic scope and typical activities because they influence the strategies 
pursued by a firm. 
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The body of strategy making literature suggests that strategic scope includes three 
elements: product scope, market scope and industry scope. According to Grant 
(2002), product scope is based on the question “how broad a range of products 
should the firm supply” while the market scope is “the geographical scope that a 
firm serves” (Grant, 2002: 72). In relation to industry scope, economists define 
industry as “a group of firms that supplies a market” (in Grant, 2002a: 86).  
Accordingly, industry scope can be defined as “the range of related industries in 
which the firm competes with a co-ordinated strategy” (Porter, 1985: 54). For 
example, an IT firm may provide mobile data solutions to the telecommunication 
industry, fast moving consumer goods industry and the banking industry by 
adopting uniquely co-ordinated strategies within each industry to suit their 
individual industry product requirements. In this paper, strategic scope will be 
assumed to be a combination of product, industry and geographical and market 
scope. 
 
A firm’s activities provide an important clue to answer the question “where does 
the firm compete” (Grant, 2002). According to Porter (1985: 36), “every firm is a 
collection of activities that are performed to design, produce, market, deliver and 
support its products. All these activities can be represented using a value chain”. 
The value chain consists of “the physically and technologically distinctive activities 
a firm performs” (Porter, 1985: 35). These can be divided into primary and support 
activities. Primary activities are “the activities involved in the physical creation of 
the product and its sale and transfer to the buyer as well as after sales assistance” 
(Porter, 1985: 38). The support activities are those activities that “support primary 
activities and each other by providing purchased inputs, technology, human 
resources and various firm-wide functions” (Porter, 1985: 38).  
 
2. Strategies and performance implications 
 
Based on the above two dimensions (strategic scope and activity configuration) the 
literature points to two distinctive realised strategy types. The first strategy type is 
when firms pursue an overall broad strategic scope with related broad activity 
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configurations (resulting in realising complex strategies). In the second strategy 
type, firms pursue an overall narrow strategic scope with related narrow activity 
configuration (resulting in realising simple strategies). However, when firms pursue 
a combination of an extremely limited strategic scope with related activity 
configuration, these firms tend to realise excessively simple strategies. Miller 
(1993) indicates that firms pursuing such excessively simple strategies may 
“ultimately come to rely on too narrow a set of customers products, and issues” 
(Miller, 1992b: 28). Furthermore, these firms “risk fairly rapid extinction in the 
event of a major market shift [due to] its gambling on the continued viability of its 
limited set of products and markets” (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 1978: 39).  
 
Similarly, firms can become too complex by attempting to serve an excessively 
broad strategic scope with an excessively broad activity configuration. For 
example, according to Ansoff (1965), when a firm pursues a broad strategic scope 
such as the “transportation business”, these firms are unable to provide a “common 
thread” that is “a relationship between present and future product-markets which 
would enable outsiders to perceive where the firm is heading” (Ansoff, 1965:105). 
As a result, firms that “thrive by aggressively diversifying often become too 
complex, fragmented and thinly spread to be effective” (Miller, 1992b: 28).    
 
Then we can assume that when firms avoid overly excessive or restrictive strategic 
scope, these firms realise moderate strategies. Consequently, since overly excessive 
or simple strategy types are linked with poor organizational performance levels, 
then we can also assume that moderate strategies are more suited for survival. 
However, what is not clear is which characteristics cause IT start-up firms to pursue 
moderate strategies. Before we identify these, it is important to understand the 
research context, the New Zealand IT industry. It is to this that we now turn.  
 
3. The information technology industry and entrepreneurship in New 
Zealand 
According to Monsted and Jensen (2001), information technology (IT) is:    
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“… an art and not a science. It is the combination of different 
skills and networks, which form the firm. You cannot in this 
field develop a prototype, and then try to sell. This is not 
possible. You have to be close to the market, and know the 
needs and the possible prices and avoid the linear thinking. 
You have to be able to live with uncertainty” 
(Monsted and Jensen, 2001: 2) 
 
High-tech firms operate in uncertain and volatile environments, where 
technologies, competitive boundaries, and market conditions change continuously 
(Bahrami and Evans, 1989; Marksman, Balkin and Schjedt, 2001). Similarly, 
Eisenhardt and Sull state that (2001) high-tech industries portray characteristics of 
intense rivalries, constantly evolving strategies, instant imitators, and few barriers 
to entry. As such, the information technology industry can be considered as a 
segment of the high tech industry sharing similar characteristics. High-tech industry 
is faced with the concept of ‘winner takes most’ and therefore, these firms need to 
operate on a mission orientation rather than on a production orientation (Arthur, 
1996). Typically, high tech firms rely on tacit knowledge-based resources such as 
employee talents, ideas and expertise rather than physical assets (Brush, Greene 
and Hardt, 2001).  
 
There is also an observable trend of increasing returns to scale in high tech 
industries (Arthur, 1996). This is because, even though the up-front cost of 
operations is high initially, as sales increase, the unit cost tends to fall. Thus when a 
product gains prevalence, it is likely to emerge as an industry standard. This occurs 
when clients invest in training of that particular product and keep updating their 
skills on the new revisions of the product. In such an industry, it pays to be the first 
and to have the best technology (Arthur, 1996). At the same time, although the IT 
industry may have brought a few major success stories like Yahoo and Microsoft, 
the attractiveness, may be more long-term than generally considered. Typically, 
bankruptcies occur on sixty percent of the high tech companies that succeed in 
getting venture capital (Nesheim, 2000). The high-tech industry is also known to 
have the highest number of “landmines and goldmines” (Nesheim, 2000). These 
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‘landmines and goldmines’ have considerable economic and social consequences 
on the New Zealand economy.  
 
New Zealand entrepreneurial firms employ fifty five percent of the full-time 
workforce (Statistics New Zealand, February 2001). This indicates the importance 
of entrepreneurial firms to the New Zealand economy. Due to the geographical 
isolation of New Zealand, these firms are well equipped with survival mechanisms 
(Campbell-Hunt, 2001). There is a strong sense of rugged individualism in the New 
Zealand culture that promotes self-employment and all-round management of their 
own businesses (McGregor and Gomes, 1999). 
  
According to a study of successful entrepreneurial firms in New Zealand 
(Campbell-Hunt, 2001), entrepreneurial leaders are generally exposed to many 
overseas markets and cultures. These successful entrepreneurs have high levels of 
enthusiasm, energy and were resilient in the face of failure. They give their utmost 
priority to their employees and establish long-term relationships based on trust, 
goodwill, integrity and show core interdependence.  
 
On the negative side, even though these entrepreneurs are technically well versed in 
their own field or trade, their entrepreneurial culture exhibits a lack of overall 
management skills that are necessary to run successful businesses (Bollard, 1998). 
This may be aggravated by the fact that small firm owner-managers are often 
responsible for all facets of firm operations (McGregor and Gomes, 1999). As a 
result, irrespective of whether these owner entrepreneurs possess adequate skills, 
they act as general managers, finance managers, human resource managers and 
production managers for their business. Similarly, there is an observable 
widespread reluctance in New Zealand to embrace the concept of world-class 
achievement and to pursue excellence (Birchfield, 2001). 
 
4. Methodology 
This study aims to examine the distinct characteristics of New Zealand start up IT 
firms that survived the dot.com collapse. It will examine how moderate versus 
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excessive strategy types influence survival, and what core organizational 
characteristics influenced the realisation of these strategies. The research tactics 
used in this study is grounded on the case study methodology.  
 
The case study methodology is a useful research framework to overcome problems 
of resistance to survey methods and smallness of the sample size (Chetty, 1998). 
The case study method enabled us to assess holistic patterns of social phenomena in 
real life situations (Numagami, 1998). In addition, we also considered that “the 
evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling and the overall 
study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 1984: 52). As such, 
multiple-case study method enabled us to gain a better understanding of the 
research issues. Similarly, a multiple case study approach helped us to study 
patterns common to cases avoiding chance associations (Chetty, 1998). Each case 
was treated individually, yet patterns were analysed through cross-case 
comparisons.  
 
In addition, we used secondary data such as newspaper articles, web site 
information, brochures and other public records relating to the firm to supplement 
the in-depth interviews. This form of triangulation “reflects an attempt to secure an 
in depth understanding of the phenomenon in question” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 
2).  
 
4.1 Data collection 
The primary method of data collection was in-depth interviews. These were 
conducted with founders of firms and/or their senior management. Each interview 
lasted about one and half-hours. During a two-year period, we maintained contact 
with the founders and management team. The participant selection was based on 
the first author’s personal networks within the IT industry in New Zealand. Her IT 
work experience helped us to establish a good rapport with the senior management 
of the selected IT firms. Some of the key data gathered from the interviews are 
outlined in Table I. 
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Insert Table I 
 
4.2 Data analysis 
Tolich and Davidson (1999) highlight how qualitative research data collection and 
analysis are inextricably interwoven in a reiterative cycle of data collection, 
reduction, firm and data interpretation. We conducted a multiple case study 
analysis to identify similarities and differences between strategic scope, activity 
configurations, business philosophies and organizational performance levels. This 
in turn helped to generate a common set of characteristics that influence the 
realised strategies.  
 
After transcribing the interviews, we extracted significant statements, phrases, and 
sentences that are directly related to organizational scope, activity configuration 
and performance. Thereafter, we clustered these statements into a common set of 
characteristics that influence the realisation of strategy types. Thus, the study was 
analysed at three levels.  
 
First, we analysed the strategy dimensions (strategic scope and activity 
configurations) at individual firms. There were three logical combinations of 
strategic scope and activity configurations: i) firms that pursue a very broad 
strategic scope and activity configuration—realising excessively complex 
strategies; ii) firms that pursue a moderate scope and activity configuration—
realising moderately simple or complex strategies; and iii) firms that pursue a very 
narrow scope and activity configuration--–realising excessively simple strategies. 
However, we were unable to find any firms that realised excessively simple 
strategies. Based on the individual strategy dimension analysis and the grouping of 
firms, we then analysed the characteristics that influenced realisation of each 
strategy grouping. The second stage of the data analysis was on identifying the 
characteristics that influenced the realisation of each strategy grouping. Finally, we 
analysed the link between the characteristics that influence the realisation of 




In the next section, we present the findings based on a comparative case study 
analysis. Due to confidentiality reasons, we created pseudo names for entrepreneurs 
and firms. The nine firms were named after nine planets. There is no relationship 




5.1 Strategic scope and activity configuration 
Jupiter and Pluto exhibit the narrowest strategic scope and activity configurations. 
Both Jupiter and Pluto offer their product to a selective market/geographic scope. 
These two firms purposefully make choices on the market/ industry and product 
scope opportunities pursued. However, Jupiter and Pluto both did not exhibit signs 
of excessive simplicity and as such, they engaged in a simple strategy that offers a 
specialised product range to a niche market.  
 
Uranus exhibits a broader product scope and a resulting activity configuration than 
Pluto and Jupiter. However, Uranus offers its products to a selective 
market/industry scope and realise a simple strategy. Saturn exhibits the broadest 
strategic scope within the firms that realise simple strategies. It offers its core 
product to a flexible geographic market. Its geographic scope varies and is 
dependent on the industry network and relationships. Saturn excels in its strategic 
scope and activity configuration by focussing on few activities within their resource 
capabilities. However, within the next few years, due to its gradual expansion of its 
strategic scope, it is possible that the company may realise a moderately complex 
strategy. 
 
Of the firms that realised a complex strategy, Mercury displays the narrowest 
strategic scope and activity configuration. Although it has the narrowest strategic 
scope and activity configuration within this group, the company did not realise a 
moderately complex strategy or a moderately simple strategy because it was 
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trapped in a strategic scope and activity configuration that was beyond its resource 
capabilities. Consequently, Mercury reveals signs of excessive complexity.  
 
Mercury acted as resellers of software products, application developers, and 
managed maintenance for its clients. The firm focussed on New Zealand, UK, USA 
and Australian markets. The company engaged in marketing, sales, product 
development, and technical maintenance activities to cater to the strategic scope 
choices. During the second year, Mercury decided to focus on the development 
aspect of its product scope and manage within their resource capabilities. However, 
even with the product scope trade off and mastering, the company did not have the 
necessary resources to fund the operations in the four geographical markets. 
Consequently, the company has now decided to engage in a narrower geographic 
scope (New Zealand and Australia), offering only a specialised product scope 
(software development). 
 
Mars, Neptune and Venus all realised excessively complex strategies exhibiting a 
similar level of excessively broad strategic scope and a resulting set of excessively 
broad activities (similar to Mercury). All three companies developed software, 
engaged in a broad geographic scope and were reliant on investor funding. 
Consequently, these firms engaged in a broad set of activities encompassing 
product customisation, establishing distributor networks within the diverse 
geographical markets, investor funding generation activities, and sales distribution 
activities.  
 
Earth realised the most complex strategy encompassing an excessive strategic 
scope and activity configuration compared to all the other firms. Earth engaged in a 
broader geographic scope and yet was unable to generate the necessary level of 
investor funding to sustain the range of activities. As a result, the company was not 
able to specialise within any product or market/industry scope. Earth showed a lack 
of trade off, lack of mastering of strategic scope and activity configuration.  
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5.2 Organizational goals  
There were three distinct organizational goals observed in the firms. One was a 
balanced and enjoyable life style. All the firms that focused on providing the 
entrepreneur and its team an enjoyable and a balanced life style realised a simple 
strategy. Generally, these firms also wanted to sustain business expansion through 
an incremental increase in its capabilities to sustain a manageable level of work and 
business risk taking. List on the stock exchange and create shareholder wealth was 
another distinct goal. Generally, listing in the stock exchange and creating wealth 
for its shareholders were the key organizational goals at all the sample firms that 
realised an excessively complex strategy (other than Mercury).  
 
Other firms followed a combination of the first two goals. Pluto exhibited an 
organizational goal that combined both achieving a balanced and enjoyable life 
style and listing in the stock exchange or selling the company in the long term for a 
profit.  
 
5.3 Business models  
There were four distinct types of business models adopted by the participating 
firms. See Exhibit below: 
 
Insert Exhibit I 
 
Generally, all firms that realised a moderately simple strategy adopted a self-
funding and self-sustaining business model. They funded their organizational 
operations and expansion from internal funding; mainly from the entrepreneur and 
managers’ personal capital, and sales revenue. These firms were not dependent on 
external funding and reinvested most of the profits back into the firms. As such 
these firms followed the philosophy of “only spending what they earn” and being 
profitable at all times except during times of expansion. Similarly, these firms 
ensured that they engaged in a strategic scope and a set of activities that are within 
their skills and financial resources. Mercury was the only participating organisation 
realising an excessively complex strategy to adopt a self-sustaining business model. 
However, it is important to note that although they used internal funding for their 
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operations, the company did not engage in a strategic scope and activity 
configuration that was within their skills and financial resource levels. 
Consequently the company was unable to sustain any form of business expansion. 
 
All the firms that realised an excessively complex strategy adopted an external 
funding based business model. These firms were dependent on external investor 
funding to sustain its operations and expansion. The rationale was to use investor 
funding to establish the necessary infrastructure and recruit key people. These firms 
generally desired large-scale global expansion and wealth creation for its 
shareholders within the first three to five years. As a consequence, the firms that 
pursued this type of a business model generally undertook a range of activities and 
operations that were beyond their existing resource capabilities. 
 
Neptune adopted a business model to develop and specialise a very specific 
strategic scope and activity configuration that creates a sustainable revenue 
generation. Thereafter, it systematically expanded into a global software firm with 
a strategic scope and activities to increase revenue generation. Pluto  on the other 
hand adopted a two-phase business model. During the first phase of business, the 
company sustained a low fixed cost and a self-sustaining business model. It out 
sourced most of its operations to reduce its fixed costs and increased the chances of 
survival during the early stages. In addition, Pluto acquired skills such as financial 
planning, business planning, project management, and IT support through its own 
shareholders. These further reduced the cost of hiring personnel to perform these 
activities. After achieving the level of expansion possible from its internal funding, 
Pluto gained a selective level of investor funding to further expand the business. 
 
The cross-case study analysis indicated that generally, all the firms that realised a 
moderately simple strategy were profitable, enjoyed incremental revenue growth 
and maintained or increased their employee numbers. On the contrary, all the 
participating firms that realised an excessively complex strategy experienced 
negative cash-flow problems, experienced downsizing, resulting in receiverships, 
and being sold. Mercury was the only firm that realised an excessively complex 
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strategy to realise a marginal profit. This may be because the company had a 
different organizational goal and pursued a different business model than the other 
firms that realised excessively complex strategy. 
 
6. Discussion 
The above findings seem to indicate two common characteristics; strategic 
particularity and holistic strategic balance (see Exhibit II). These in turn influenced 
the realised strategies of these firms. Next, these two common characteristics are 
discussed.  
 
Insert Exhibit II 
 
6.1 Strategic particularity: Mastering, organizational theme and trade-off 
The analysis of strategic scope and activity configuration seem to indicate that, the 
firms exhibiting moderate levels of strategic scope and activities tend to portray the 
qualities of mastering, cohesive organizational theme, and make purposeful 
choices. Mastering occurs when firms develop a distinctive competence, requiring 
dedication and passionate single mindedness (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Porter, 
1980). The mastering component may contain ‘employee knowledge and skills, 
technical systems, managerial systems, values and norms’ which could be the core 
capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or what are called distinctive competencies 
(Hitt and Ireland, 1985) of a firm.  
 
Jupiter, Uranus, Pluto and Saturn all illustrated the distinctive quality of mastering. 
All of these firms formulated and brought together their employee 
knowledge/skills, technical systems, managerial systems, and values/norms with 
dedication to enable their individual companies to become masters in their core 
offering. Consequently, these firms seem to have a core offering that is valuable, 
rare, inimitable and organizational specific (Barney, 1997). 
 
However, the firms that did not show the existence of mastering appear to have 
faced negative consequences. For example, Miller indicated that “middle of the 
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road strategies may be anathema to competitive advantage – the jack-of-all-trades 
is too often master of none” (1992b: 49). Similarly, Porter (1985:16) agreed by 
saying that “a firm that engages in each generic strategy but fails to achieve any of 
them is stuck in the middle”. This lack of mastering is visible in firms that had 
realised an excessively complex strategy. For example, firms like Venus and Earth 
were engaged in a broad geographic scope, a broad product scope, and a related 
broad set of activities, which resulted in them not being able to cultivate the quality 
of mastering within any product offering/market.  
 
This quality of mastering appears to be a core concept highlighted in the book – 
‘Crossing the Chasm’ by Moore (1991). Accordingly, Moore (1991: 66) prescribes 
IT firms to,  
“…cross the chasm by targeting a very specific niche market where 
you can dominate from the outset, force your competitors out of that 
market niche, and then use it as a base for broader operations” 
 
Moore (1991:68) says that generally sales driven firms are not willing to “adopt 
any discipline that would ever require a firm to stop pursuing any sale at any time 
for any reason”. When this occurs, the firms can become less market driven and 
decrease its survival chances in the long run (Moore, 1991).  
 
Although Neptune ’s founder initially based the company business formula around 
the philosophy prescribed by Moore (1991), it actually realised what Moore (1991) 
prescribed firms not to do; pursuing any sale at any time for any reason. As a result, 
Neptune is engaged in a broad strategic scope (catering to a diverse range of 
industries such as gaming, telecommunication, finance, retail, Internet and 
healthcare) requiring a broad set of activities. Neptune as indicated by Moore 
(1991) operated in diverse industries by “chasing all possible sales opportunities” 
in the market. However, as a result, the company has reduced its mastering in the 
strategic approach by diluting their resource capabilities. 
 
The quality of organizational theme can be defined as consciously developing and 
articulating (seeks consensus on) an internal organizational image (Miles, Snow, 
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Meyer & Coleman, 1978: 28). This can be achieved at firms through developing 
“powerful, ideologically embedded priorities that pervade an organization, 
impelling its people to embrace consistent values and purposes” (Miller and 
Whitney, 1999: 7). It is this form of theme that is prevalent in Jupiter , Pluto , 
Saturn  and Uranus . These firms portray a set of priorities that illustrate a self-
sustaining value system, a need to specialise in a core offering, prioritising on 
relationship marketing, making work enjoyable, and the desire for balance in their 
personal life.  
 
Firms that “have no powerful unifying focus that gives them uniqueness, spirit and 
direction” lack profound character (Miller and Whitney, 1999: 5). For example at 
AT&T, “the absence of a core theme or a clear set of priorities seems to have 
prevented the corporation from excelling at any one business or function” (Miller 
and Whitney, 1999: 6). This lack of core theme may be because, “AT&T has 
pursued too many paths, none with great conviction or distinction” (Miller and 
Whitney, 1999: 6). Similarly, Earth pursued too many paths without much 
conviction and consequently over stretched itself and went into receivership.  
 
Neptune, on the other hand, had a value system that did not suit current market 
needs. For example, up until recently the company was managed by its original 
software developers/founders. They were very “product and sales oriented” and did 
not understand the mass-market needs and competition. Consequently, the founders 
created a “crisis oriented management culture” where the company attempted to 
gain any sale to survive in the short term. It expended high levels of resources on 
product development and customisation of products to suit individual clients. As a 
result, the company was unable to attain a suitable return on their investment. 
According to Moore (1991: 68), “the consequences of being sales-driven during the 
chasm period are put it simply, fatal”. This seems to indicate that not only should 
an organization have a core value system that binds the company together, but the 




The quality of trade off can be best illustrated by Porter who notes, “becoming 
stuck in the middle is often a manifestation of a firm’s unwillingness to make 
choices” (1985: 17). Therefore, firms need to “deliberately choose a different set of 
activities to deliver a unique mix of value” (Porter, 1996: 64). When firms do not 
make such a deliberate choice, such firms may pursue “diverse range of activities 
and a broad scope that may result in loosing sight of what business they are in” 
(Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994: 175). This is further emphasised when Miller 
(1992b: 31) says “To do any thing really well requires giving some thing up. 
Because there is within us only so much talent and energy, it must be focussed for 
maximum effect”.  
 
Firms such as Earth, Venus and Mars showed unwillingness to make choices and as 
a result got into a diverse range of activities and a broad strategic scope blurring 
their core business offering. On the other hand, Jupiter, Saturn, Pluto and Uranus 
continue to make clear choices on strategic scope and activity configuration and 
manage to evolve their core offering to suit the changing market needs. Similarly, 
with time all these firms took steps to increase their strategic scope (either product 
or market/industry) to suit their enhanced skills and resource levels. 
 
In sum, the above analyses indicate that the firms that realised a moderately simple 
strategy realised moderate strategic particularity, while firms that realised an 
excessively complex strategy showed lack of strategic particularity. Although the 
findings did not identify any firm that realised excessive levels of strategic 
particularity, it is possible that some other group of firms may realise excessive 
levels of strategic particularity. Next we examine this aspect. 
  
6.2 Holistic strategic balance 
The findings suggest that the presence of strategic particularity appears to have an 
impact on a firm’s overall strategic balance. The element of mastering, purposeful 
trade-offs and organizational themes in firms like Jupiter, Saturn, Pluto and Uranus 
enabled them to ensure that they do not enter into excessive scope levels and pursue 
an excessively complex set of activities that cannot be supported by their existing 
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resource and skill levels. Miller (1992b: 26) says that outstanding corporations “are 
a bit like beautiful poems or sonatas - their parts or elements fit together 
harmoniously to express a theme”. He (ibid) identified such a balance at ITT where 
their cast of players (human, ideological strategic and structural) “complemented 
each other and were essential to the enactment of the play”. Tichy highlights a 
similar internal perspective (1983: 55), when pointing out that strategic balance is a 
result of a “high level of interdependence and integration between the technical, 
political and cultural systems at work”.  
 
This form of strategic balance was present in four of the nine firms. Saturn had a 
consistent theme of self-sustaining philosophy running through the firm. It 
purposely made a choice on what activities and scope they wanted to engage in. As 
a result, the company was able to balance the level of scope and activities with 
organizational resource capabilities to realise holistic strategic balance. Jupiter 
purposely wanted to maintain a limit in the strategic scope and activities it engaged 
in to retain a manageable level of risk. As such, there was an apparent coherence 
between the strategic scope and activity configuration in relation to its 
organizational financial and human resource capabilities. Pluto managed to 
maintain a low-cost operational structure and a complementary self-sustaining 
business philosophy. Consequently, it has been able to create a balance between its 
internal resource capabilities and realised strategy strategic scope/activity 
configuration. Lastly, Uranus is another firm where its “parts or elements fit 
together harmoniously to express a theme”. It engages in a strategic scope and a set 
of activities that complement each other to realise a holistic strategic balance. 
 
As such, it is evident that the realised strategic scope and activities of the individual 
firms complemented each other at Jupiter, Uranus, Pluto and Saturn. Similarly, the 
value systems and activities of these firms were all essential to the overall strategic 
performance. All of these firms showed a high level of integration and 
interdependence amongst the organizational activities. In contrast, there was a 
visible lack of interdependence and integration between the internal elements, 
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activities, and value systems at Venus, Mars, and Earth. Consequently, these firms 
indicated the non-existence of holistic strategic balance as elaborated below. 
 
Neptune is unable to achieve a balance between its strategic scope, activity 
configuration and its organizational capabilities. This is because it engages in a 
high level of customisation within a broad geographic/industry scope resulting in 
high overseas operational costs that is beyond its existing financial resource 
capabilities. As such, the company is still struggling to create integration between 
the technical, political and cultural systems that would be essential to realise 
holistic strategic balance. 
 
Venus is still pursuing an excessively complex strategy, even though it had 
attempted to reduce its level of complexity in the activities and the strategic scope. 
Consequently, the company has not yet managed to fit its activities and strategic 
scope together harmoniously to express a theme and achieve an organizational 
balance between the existing resource capabilities, and the strategic scope and 
activity configuration. As a result, Venus continues to struggle for its survival and 
is still a long way from achieving its organizational goal – listing in the stock 
exchange as a profitable IT firm.  
 
Earth continued to cater to a broad market/industry scope that required a broad 
range of activities. Three years after re-launching, Earth was liquidated, as it was 
unable to achieve a balance between the organizational strategic scope/activity 
configuration and its resource capabilities. 
 
Mercury was the only firm that followed a self-sustaining business philosophy to 
realise an excessively complex strategy. This may be because the company pursued 
an excessively broad geographic scope and a set of activities that was beyond their 
resource capabilities. As such, the company was unable to complement its internal 
activities to realise holistic strategic balance. Nevertheless, the company has now 
shifted to pursue a moderately simple strategy that encompasses a geographic scope 
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and a set of activities that is within their resource capabilities and thus continue to 
be a profitable entity. 
 
Mars did portray some form of mastering and purposeful focus on product scope. 
However, it seemed to have pursued a geographic scope that was beyond its 
organizational capabilities. Therefore, the company was not able to achieve an 
organizational balance between the available resource capabilities (investor 
funding), and the pursued product and market/geographic scope strategy. After 
Mars was bought out, the Australian principal refocused to cater only to 
Australian/New Zealand geographic scope. Thereby, the Australian principals 
intentionally created a balance between the pursued strategy (market/industry and 
product scope) and financial resource capabilities. Today, the company continues to 
operate successfully within this business model. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Any implications drawn from this research should be accompanied with caution. 
Drawing conclusions about the characteristics of IT start-up firms based only on 
nine New Zealand start up IT firms is a process fraught with potential hazards. The 
present study was based from a leaders’ perspective. There is a need for a similar 
study on a larger sample of business leaders from start up IT companies. These 
leaders could be drawn from different cultural settings, industry segments and at 
differing levels of market, product and organizational life stages. Future research 
could compare the findings of this study from other stakeholders’ perspectives—
such as non-executive employees, shareholders, customers and suppliers.  
 
Despite these limitations, the findings of this study indicate the importance of 
balancing strategic capabilities with the realised organizational strategy (strategic 
scope and activity configuration). Jupiter, Uranus, Pluto and Saturn all followed the 
principle “spend only what you earn” and “engaged in activities and a strategic 
scope that is within its skill and resource capability levels”. However, all four firms 
built their resource capability and skill levels, and subsequently expanded their 
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strategic scope and activity levels to create evolving levels of holistic balance that 
indicated consistent, self-sustaining organizational growth levels. 
 
In contrast, Earth, Venus, Neptune and Mars adopted the opposite business 
philosophy. They pursued a strategic scope and a set of activities that was beyond 
their resource capabilities. These firms failed to realise the need for balancing 
actual resource and skill capabilities with their strategy (strategic scope and activity 
configuration). Instead, these firms based their strategic scope and activity 
decisions on forecasted external financial funding. Therefore, these firms struggled 
to create a balance in their overall strategy and faced negative or fluctuating 
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Overall balance and moderate strategic complexity/simplicity 
No balance and excessive strategic complexity 
No balance and excessive strategic simplicity 
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